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Abstract
This project argues that mind uploading and virtual reality are the most likely
solutions to the human-driven climate change that will render the Earth unlivable.
Drawing on scientific research, the speculations of science fiction, and critical theory,
this project first argues that this solution is most probable because it exploits current
capitalist trends and does not demand the sacrifice of luxury; concomitantly, it functions
as a solution to problems outside of climate change and human survival regarding human
health, progress, evolution and [interstellar] exploration.
This project further explores: 1) what problems mind uploading could solve and
to what extent; 2) how the dissolving distinction between human and machine will affect
human identity individually and collectively; 3) how it will affect the way humans
interact with one another as well as the natural world and universe; 4) what kinds of
economic, political, and social systems would emerge in a virtual environment largely
relieved of the necessity of material production; and finally, 5) the ethics of this solution.
While this project is speculative in nature, its aim is to explore human identity in
relation to technology and technology in relation to nature, to interrogate the pervasive
critical conception of technology as corrosive to human nature and to “the natural,” to
question the very idea of an essential “human nature,” and to critique human practices
and current systems of economic, political, and social organization with the goal of
approaching possible solutions to manifest problems.
Keywords: mind uploading; virtual reality; climate change; capitalism; science fiction

iv

Table of Contents
Page
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iv
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................1
Imagining Solutions: The Emergence of Mind Uploading ......................................5
Considering Plausibility: An Argument for Mind Uploading ...............................10
Considering Ethics .................................................................................................15
Further Considerations & Science Fiction as Testing Grounds .............................18
Clarification of Terms ............................................................................................21
II. CASE STUDIES: CURRENT REPRESENTATIONS IN SCIENCE FICTION .........22
Neuromancer ..........................................................................................................23
Ready Player One ..................................................................................................30
The Matrix .............................................................................................................37
Real Vs. Virtual .....................................................................................................43
III.VIRTUAL FUTURES: STRUCTURING POWER .....................................................49
IV. CONCLUSION............................................................................................................57
WORKS CITED ................................................................................................................60

v

I. Introduction
Four years ago, journalist and author Annalee Newitz published her book Scatter,
Adapt, Remember: How to Survive a Mass Extinction, a compendium of survival
strategies for a species threatened by an impending sixth extinction. At the time of
writing this, New Philosopher, a bestselling magazine which frequently features
interviews with leading intellectuals, had entitled its newest issue “The Future of
Humanity.” The issue tackles topics ranging from the post-human, virtual reality, and
artificial intelligence (AI), to the possibility of extinction and questions of whose future it
is that exists within the discourse of what future may manifest; what future humans will
make manifest and which humans it is that possess and exercise influence over the future.
On April 21 of this year, everyone’s favorite “science guy,” Bill Nye, will premiere a
new show, Bill Nye Saves the World, the title of which operates on the assumption that
the world is indeed in danger and requires saving. Travelers, a new Netflix show,
features future consciousness sent back in time to inhabit the bodies of humans living in
the present with the aim of saving humankind from its bleak future; thus, it posits that the
twenty-first century is one on which the future of humanity hinges.
Preoccupation with the future is obviously not a new phenomenon: many
religious master-narratives demonstrate humanity’s anxiety about the end of times, which
they then propose a solution to via salvation through an overarching, omniscient entity or
energy. The secular, scientific reincarnation of the fundamental religious preoccupation
with impending apocalypse does not, however, come equipped with a solution. The
narrative of climate change and the death of our mother planet, as it requires a collective
action and a collective solution, necessitates a collective belief on which
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religious narratives have never had to depend. While scientists, like Bill Nye, encourage
a sense of optimism about our future despite continual failure to address the causes and
consequences of climate change, or even to accept that it exists, a media that imagines
possible human futures betrays an overwhelming sense of resignation to the catastrophic.
Since the 1970s and 80s, visions of dystopian futures have proliferated,
particularly within science fiction. Where once the genre speculated about the limitless
possibilities of humankind’s future, it now extrapolates “current sociocultural, political,
and scientific developments” into the often near future and “follow[s] [them] to their
potentially devastating conclusions” (Otto 180). In other words, sci-fi now imagines only
one possibility for humankind: cataclysmic change often resulting in our species’ near or
total extinction. Even those fictions that ultimately show humankind overcoming
extreme environmental and social degradation, either as a result of development and
climate change or warfare, still posit that humans must reach a “tipping point,” a point at
which society suffers irreparable deterioration as a result of human action and which
ultimately transforms the way in which society operates. Indeed, this tipping point often
renders Earth inoperably uninhabitable and necessitates human evacuation. Science
fiction is thus left to speculate only how humankind will react to and survive this
cataclysmic change rather than if it will occur.
Interstellar, for example, posits a future in which industrial agriculture and the
consequent lack of crop diversity results in a blight which wipes out nearly all crops
excepting corn and thus decreases the amount of oxygen in the atmosphere. This,
compounded with frequent dust storms that ravage humans’ lungs as well as their homes,
destines humanity to suffocate. As an inhabitant of a future Earth devastated by poverty
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and resource scarcity, Laren, believes is humankind’s destiny in Octavia Butler’s Parable
of the Sower, humans in Interstellar literally “take root among the stars.” They inhabit
space stations orbiting Saturn and other planets, while continuing to search for planets
suited to human needs. In After Earth, as in Interstellar, humans have found a new home
after an ecological disaster forced them to vacate Earth. In Wall-E, fleets of obese,
zombified humans float around a megacorporation’s starliner in hoverchairs while only
sentient, trash-compacting robots remain on Earth, attempting to unbury the planet from
beneath human garbage. Few narratives exist in which humankind recognizes the
dangers inherent in current developments and systems in time to adapt them to prevent
further ecological, social, and political consequences without first reaching this tipping
point. Snowpiercer is perhaps one of these few, though it remains true to the pessimism
of contemporary sci-fi while underscoring the uncertainty in “geoengineering,” or the
“use [of] technology to shape geological processes” (Newitz 216-17). In the film, CW-7,
a substance developed to cool the Earth, is released into the atmosphere, effectively
cooling Earth until it enters a new ice age.
While many of these fictions, particularly eco-dystopian fictions, exist as “part of
the utopian project to imagine and bring about positive social change” and thus display an
“impulse towards hope” if not for humanity then for individual humans, the burgeoning
of these dystopian narratives reveal the growing resignation of scientifically literate
thinkers to the likelihood that we will destroy ourselves, the planet, or both (Otto 180).
While the way in which we respond to impending ecological disaster and social chaos
varies between narratives, all share the conviction that we will face a man-made disaster
to which our survival demands we respond. Contemporary science fiction thus reflects
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the certainty that we will reach a tipping point, and many scientists maintain that we
already have.1
Thus, little is being done to mitigate the consequences of ceaseless and
accelerating development despite our recognition of them and despite scientists’
increasingly urgent warnings that the human species must unite against climate change
and environmental degradation. Many Individuals maintain that climate change either
does not exist or is not as serious a threat as purported to be. The election in the United
States of Donald Trump, a president who claims that, “the concept of global warming
was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing noncompetitive,” and who has appointed a climate denier and ally of the fossil fuel industry,
Scott Pruitt, as the head of the EPA, seems a prescient warning of the world’s inability to
reach a consensus in the face of ever-accelerating change. Yet, Trump’s espoused views
on climate change suggest something much more insidious about humankind’s
relationship with Earth and its impetus, or lack thereof, to transform this relationship so
that it is less parasitic and more symbiotic: that human innovation is dependent on an
increasingly dominant capitalist economic system that encourages—or more accurately,
necessitates—competition and exploitation.

See: Max McClure, “Earth May be Approaching 'Tipping Point,' Stanford Scientist
Says,” Stanford Report, Stanford News, 7 June 2012,
http://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/june/earth-tipping-point-060712.html.
David Briello, “State of the Earth: Still Seeking Plan A for Sustainability,” Scientific
American,12 Oct. 2012, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/planet-seeks-planfor-sustainability/.
Annie Leonard, The Story of Stuff: How Our Obsession with Stuff Is Trashing the Planet,
Our Communities, and Our Health-and a Vision for Change, Free Press, 2010.
Naomi Klien, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate, Simon & Schuster,
2014.
1
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Because human innovation is dependent on capitalism and capitalism on
consumption, and thus the exploitation of natural resources, it is implausible that we can
innovate ways to conserve natural resources while maintaining the competition necessary
for business to thrive. While humankind may innovate new “green” ways to harness and
produce energy and to manufacture goods, this “greening” of industry will only slow
climate change, not reverse or mitigate its effects. In the words of Bill Nye, we would
only be taking our collective foot off the accelerator, not pressing on the brakes (Nye).
Furthermore, our economic systems still necessitate mass production and mass
consumption to endure. We cannot simultaneously conserve and consume at the rates
necessary to stabilize both the planet and the global economy. The two are mutually
exclusive, and adapting our current systems to accommodate ecological health is
evidently such an economic threat that a future President of the United States has reduced
the notion of climate change to a competitive economic strategy. That humans will reach
a tipping point is no longer speculative; it is certain.
Imagining Solutions: The Emergence of Mind Uploading
While humankind indisputably approaches ecological disaster, many sci-fi
writers, scientists, economists, and historians suggest that we are on the verge of some
other tipping point, as well, though exactly how this will manifest or what it may look
like is contentious. As development necessitates growth, or endless increases in
consumption, many thinkers question how this system can sustain itself when its ends,
the eradication of poverty and a universal increase in the standard of living, are met.
How will these ends be met on a planet with a finite amount of resources? Finally, if
progress is linked to consumption, what will we do now that our consumption is largely
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responsible for our impending demise? What will happen when we no longer need to
consume? In other words, where is all of this progress, this development, leading? This
is the precipice that we are approaching. If humans do unite against climate change, we
will have to fundamentally, and quickly, overhaul our current economic systems, which
will in turn upend our social and political systems of organization. Insofar as democracy
itself requires development, dominant Western political systems may dismantle as we
confront the end of development. How will humans cope with this shift and what other
systems will emerge?2
Some thinkers propose that before this comes to pass, humankind will face the
“singularity,” a moment in which the invention of an artificial superintelligence will kick
start the “ever accelerating progress of technology and changes in the mode of human
life, which gives the appearance of approaching some essential singularity in the history
of the race beyond which human affairs, as we know them, could not continue” (Ulam 5).
Proponents of this theory maintain that the singularity will be a primarily positive
development in the history of humankind, though they recognize the potential for it to
create a dystopian future, perhaps most accessibly envisioned in the popular The Matrix
Trilogy.3 While the exact tenants of this hypothesis vary among its proponents and each
tenant in its plausibility, one technological possibility that arises tangential to many of the
hypothesized developments of the singularity is the divorce of intelligence from biology.
In other words, the rise of artificial intelligence and the artificial augmentation of the

2

For more information on the end of economic growth and development, see:
Christopher Doll, “Our World Without Economic Growth,” Our World, United Nations
University, 14 April 2010, https://ourworld.unu.edu/en/the-end-of-the-growth.
3
The titular matrix refers to the simulated reality in which most humans live while an
advanced race of sentient machines exploit their biological bodies for energy.
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human body and brain, when conflated, may ultimately result in mind uploading or whole
brain emulation.
Mind uploading, however, does not necessitate the creation of artificial
intelligence. 4 Indeed, the opposite may be true; the ability to upload human minds to
computers may be the only way to spawn artificial intelligence, perhaps through some
sort of reproductive process that occurs through the transmission and conflation of
information within a computer, a digital analog to reproduction through the transmission
of fluids between biological bodies, rather than creating intelligence from “scratch.” In
this sense, I, and many critics of the concept of the singularity disagree with John Von
Neumann, Stanislaw Ulam, and Kurzweil’s hypotheses. This is where mind uploading
diverges from the popular notion of the singularity, though only in the sense that it does
not require, as Kurzweil’s singularity does, the advent of artificial intelligence or its
resultant ever-accelerating rate of technological change. It would still, undeniably, result
in the transcendence of the “limitations of our biological bodies and brains,” thus
“irreversibly transform[ing]” human life (Kurzweil 6 and 9).
In that it must precede the creation of artificial intelligence, mind uploading, the
transferring of our consciousness to machines, either to live in a simulated world as in
The Matrix, or to inhabit cyborg bodies as in Ghost in the Shell, is a somewhat more
plausible manifestation of the singularity if we accept, as I do, Axel Cleereman’s Radical
Plasticity Thesis, in which he theorizes that consciousness develops out of both natural
neural processes in the brain as well as the brain’s “continuous attempts at predicting not
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Mind uploading, also referred to as whole brain emulation, refers to the ability to upload
human consciousness, an individual’s “self” to computers as software.
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only the consequences of its actions on the world and on other agents, but also the
consequences of activity in one cerebral region on activity in other regions”
(Cleereman).5
Thus, mind uploading arises as an alternative to Kurzweil’s proposed singularity
in that it harnesses what intelligence currently exists (our own), and augments this
intelligence both physically and intellectually, rather than insisting we invent a new,
original intelligence that rapidly evolves. The recent invention of mind-operable
prostheses that harness neural impulses to augment the human body and allow the user to
“feel” texture exemplifies the likelihood that humans will embrace technology as a way
to protect their humanity from degradation and to correct damage inflicted on their
bodies. This type of prosthetic has the ability to make patients feel, as Les Baugh, a man
who lost his arms as a teenager and now participates in clinical research, states, “not so
much robotic as . . . back to human; being a whole person” (Canepari et al.). While mind
uploading would perhaps suggests the opposite of what Courtney Moran, a clinical

5

In his thesis, Cleereman recognizes the importance of emotion, which he believes is
“sorely missing from contemporary discussions of consciousness,” as a learning tool; in
his words, an experiencer must not only learn, it must care about what it is learning and
how that affects it and the world around it (Cleereman conclusion).
This suggests that while consciousness could likely survive a substrate shift and exist in
computerized environments by mapping the brain’s functions (as what the brain has
learned has shaped how it functions), consciousness perhaps cannot come into existence
without having first evolved naturally; thus, AI must be a continuation of our own human
consciousness – our consciousness produced within machines – but cannot be created
independently of it. As John Searle states in his review of Superintelligence: Paths
Dangers, Strategies and The 4th Revolution: How the Infosphere is Reshaping Human
Reality, computers have “no [real] intelligence, no motivation, no autonomy, and no
agency;” all psychological behaviors are only programmed functions that have no basis in
real psychology (Searle). Without any sort of emotion and thus motivation, computers
can never evolve an intelligence beyond what is programmable; they cannot learn outside
of their programming.
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prosthetist, states is her hope for individual patients, i.e. that “the limbs should become a
part of [the patient], not [the patient] becoming part of the machine,” it would still
function as a means of preserving humanity from degradation, and perhaps even
extinction (Canepari et al.). Humans, rather than leaving the human world, would be
joining a world created by and for humans; a world more human than our current home.
Mind uploading thus reaffirms rather than threatens human nature. Perhaps Crake, of
Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake, rightly suggests that humans should not think of
technology as separate from human nature, but rather a logical and inevitable extension
of it.
Just as Kurzweil proposes that the singularity will occur around 2045, researchers
invested in mind uploading hope that we will know enough about consciousness to begin
uploading our minds by that same year (Piore).6 Certainly, humans should hope so; as
human activity continues to warm and pollute the planet,7 the window of time for humans
to act preventatively against political instability and global warfare or a sixth extinction
event is quickly narrowing. Even human actions, as in Snowpiercer, that could prevent
or slow climate change and environmental degradation might result in environmental
and/or political instability; for example, embracing green energy while heavily taxing

6

However, if consciousness is a quantum mechanical phenomenon, this may not be
possible until the advent of quantum computing, a development not likely to manifest by
2045 (Lewis).
7
The warming caused by human activity is then accelerated by a number of positive
feedback loops. For example, as the polar ice caps melt, the planet is less able to reflect
the sun’s rays (i.e. to ward off heat), and the increase of water vapor in the air caused by
warming results in further warming. For more on climactic positive feedback loops, see:
Guy Mcpherson, “19 Ways Climate Change is Now Feeding Itself,” Transition Voice, 19
August 2013, http://transitionvoice.com/2013/08/19-ways-climate-change-is-nowfeeding-itself/.
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fossil fuels might destabilize an oil-dependent Middle East. While possible solutions
abound,8 each with their own set of criticisms and drawbacks, mind uploading is perhaps
the most plausible solution to date. It may even be the most ethical.
Considering Plausibility: An Argument for Mind Uploading
Let us begin with plausibility. There are two primary reasons that many of the
solutions described in Annalee Newitz’s Scatter, Adapt, and Remember and elsewhere
strike me as implausible. The first is that many of these solutions (e.g. terraforming
earth; creating underground, domed, or living cities; colonizing Mars or other planets)
require vast human-driven changes to the environment, of either our planet or others, that
may either take too long to develop to save humanity or will have unintended
consequences that are equally as bad or worse for humans and animals than climate
change. The second is that many of these same solutions require vast overhauls to
current political and social systems or a consensus that a divided global population will
never be able to reach to achieve them. I do not have faith, as some optimistic scientists
do, that humankind will unite against a common enemy—in this case, climate change—
unless that enemy can be tangibly fought via warfare. The enemy that we humans must
fight is the aggregate of progress via development, capitalism, democracy, and industry;
the very systems and principles that have come to define the modern era and modern
values.9

See Annalee Newitz’s Scatter, Adapt, and Remember: How Humans Will Survive a
Mass Extinction for a brief overview of possible solutions, some more far-fetched than
others.
9
I recognize that these are primarily Western values. However, modernity is, for all
intents and purposes, a Western construction/invention. As society becomes global, it
becomes homogenously Western.
8
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But this does not necessarily have to be our enemy; we do not have to struggle
against it, to continue to define ourselves as biological beings living within and
dependent upon our biological ecosystems. This is where mind uploading emerges from
the dark, dusty corners of speculative science fiction. To that extent, I doubt our ability
to ever change these systems or to collectively foster a willingness to abandon them—a
requisite of remaining on a planet with a sensitive ecosphere and finite resources—the
only plausible solutions are those that embrace or exploit this aggregate as a means of
change. Mind uploading, unlike terraforming and sustainability practices, can exist
simultaneously as the progeny of development as well as its end; while its realization
necessitates exploitation of the environment additional to current consumption, its
achievement would ultimately trigger a sudden and dramatic decrease in the consumption
of natural resources. Mind uploading would divorce human consciousness—human
life—from biology; humans would no longer require food or water to live, and plant and
animal agriculture would vanish.
Furthermore, I posit that a machine, no matter its size or computational power,
would be easier to support in terms of energy use than all that it takes to sustain
biological, human life, both in terms of actual survival (e.g., food, clean water, clothing,
and shelter) as well as humanity’s trajectory of development and progress. Human
development, except for enhancements to and maintenance of the mother computer,
would exist entirely within a virtual world and thus would no longer exploit or pollute the
natural environment. Depending on how exactly this concept manifested, humans might
only need to affix a vast array of solar panels and wind turbines to the mainframe to
power the human world. Perhaps we would launch our new world into orbit around the
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Earth or other planets, harnessing solar radiation to power our existence.10 Maybe we
would turn the universe, as Nick Bostrom suggests, into a series of computational
substrates (Newitz 254). If humanity uploads itself to a machine, the possibilities, as for
science fiction writers of yore, become endless.
Furthermore, while the idea of mind uploading may currently be too outlandish to
receive direct funding, much of the research necessary to realize mind uploading is
conducted indirectly as medical researchers study and image the brain to understand and
treat neurodegenerative diseases like Alzheimer’s and dementia (Quinn). As medical
technology advances, our ability to map the human brain and understand human
consciousness will accelerate. Researchers are already conducting simulated experiments
involving a brain-computer interface, or neuroprosthesis, to “resurrect consciousness,” or
to “restore consciousness that is lost due to brain damage, degeneration, or decay”
(Astakhov 245-246). That mind uploading could serve as a blanket solution to a
multitude of problems nearly ensures that research will, in some form, be executed, even
if it can only be executed “bit by bit,” if you will. Scientists and developers will likely
conduct much of the research requisite to mind uploading as they find commercialized,
(i.e. profitable, purposes for it) whether they be for entertainment, education, or medical
intervention.
Much of our technology is already heading in this direction and will lead quite
naturally to mind uploading. Pokemon GO is a rudimentary example of how virtual
reality has and exceedingly will come to manifest in our lives, thus normalizing life in a

10

Indeed, we have the technology. See: https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn13545nanomaterial-turns-radiation-directly-into-electricity/
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world enhanced by technology and in which most of what we see is simulated rather than
materially real while developing mapping technologies and computing power in
increasingly smaller machines. It is my sincere hope that this technology comes to
manifest as Jeff Vandermeer envisions in his essay, “Are We Alone?” Suggesting that
someone develop a virtual reality program which allows us to see the “chemical signals
in the air from beetles and plants, pheromone trails laid down by ants, and every other bit
of the natural world’s communications invisible to our primitive senses,” as well as,
“every trace of pesticide . . . and other human-made intercessions on the landscape,”
Vandermeer shows how virtual reality technology, rather than subverting the reality of
human existence, ultimately enhances and reaffirms it. As virtual reality programs that
capitalize on the natural world—our neighborhoods and suburbs, cities and nature trails
winding around mountains in remote regions of the world—proliferate, the mapping
necessary to simulate the home seamlessly and realistically we hold dear as we all upload
into a single mainframe and sequester ourselves from the damage we have done to the
earth will already be done.
While Vandermeer’s vision would no doubt provide entertainment, it also serves
as a powerful example of how we might harness virtual reality for educational purposes;
this technology could be used to enhance history lessons by projecting users into the past,
and, as in Vandermeer’s proposal, enhance scientific understanding of the natural world.
Part of development’s agenda is the eradication of poverty (though, its ability to achieve
this goal is contended), and that necessitates education. As we strive to develop globally,
virtual reality could be revolutionary to the education of those living in remote areas
without the resources necessary to receive an education (ideally) equal to those in
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developed areas. Mind uploading, specifically, could help to facilitate interaction with
peers and trained teachers, while providing virtual access to laboratory equipment,
libraries, computers,11 gymnasiums, and linguistic and cultural immersion. Uploading
into a simulated reality to perform science experiments would conserve resources even if
in a developed nation, and any human could access, if simulated, the world’s best
libraries.
Again, many of these ideas translate back to entertainment: humans could embark
on virtual vacations, projecting ourselves into the past or perhaps other simulated,
fictional worlds. We could shrink down and explore all the life that exists in a patch of
grass and battle or ride on ants. We could live out an entire lifetime as a fictional
character, seeing how the choices we make affect our happiness, achieving high scores
based on how long the character lives, as in the Rick and Morty episode, “Mortynight
Run.” Or we might exploit virtual reality within the criminal justice system as in the
“White Christmas” episode of Black Mirror, locking people into virtual prisons or
manipulating simulated reality as a means of eliciting confessions. If developed, the
ability to “pass over” into a simulated reality for good once we die and thus attain
immortality, as in another episode of Black Mirror, “San Junipero,” would perhaps draw
the greatest revenue or investment. Indeed, this would be, I posit, the first step in
humanity’s permanent dispossession of their biological bodies. While I embrace a
utopian vision of mind uploading in which all humans are uploaded to a mainframe

11

Here, I am assuming that, to be plausible, virtual reality in undeveloped nations would
require students uploading to a single mainframe solely intended for mind uploading.
Thus, computers for actual personal and educational use would exist only within the
simulated reality. Every student having their own personal computer seems implausible.
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regardless of their ability to monetarily contribute to its maintenance, and in which all
humans contribute equally in terms of labor, I recognize that the plausibility of an
interchangeably virtual and cyborg existence necessitates its initial commercialization
and profitability. That it palpably benefits us and perpetuates development is what
renders its realization more practical and probable than, say, sustainability.
Considering Ethics
While mind uploading’s ability to work in tandem with development is primarily
responsible for its plausibility as the best, or only, solution to humanity’s current
predicament, so too is its shift in emphasis away from the environment and towards the
culprit of environmental degradation: humans. As established, humans can never be sure
how our intervention in geological processes, no matter how well-intentioned, will affect
the Earth. It is not as if we have the ability to test out solutions, except through
simulations—through virtual realities—that may or may not be accurate. We have only
one earth, and as of yet, we do not possess the ability to permanently leave it; we cannot
afford to effect change without the certainty that it will succeed, or at least, that it will not
backfire. Furthermore, no matter how we intervene in geological processes, humans can
never overcome planetary resource limitations. Insofar as we will always consume, we
will always need to ceaselessly expand, but every planet will have its limit. Excepting a
simulated reality, no reality exists in which humans can create new resources. Every
planet we terraform and inhabit, we will exhaust, and the rate at which we exhaust them
will increase geometrically in tandem with population growth. Any solution that focuses
on the state of the environment, rather than humans’ role in it, can only be a short-term
solution.
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Furthermore, changing humans to suit a multitude of environments seems a bit
more manageable task, as well as a richer experience, than changing a multitude of
environments to suit humans. Many scientists and science fiction narratives envision
these changes taking place on a biological level. However, just to survive the radiation
we would suffer to reach other planets, humans would have to undergo immense
biological changes or else craft unreasonably expensive and resource-dependent
spaceships.12 Once we reach those planets, we would have to adapt to each unique
atmosphere. To survive in an environment inhospitable to human life, Juna, in Amy
Thompson’s The Color of Distance, must physically, and thus biologically, transform
into a member of the amphibious alien species she and her lost team of surveyors
intended to study. However, these changes do not apply, as with mind uploading and
virtual reality, strictly to human survival; often, these are explored in relation to human
improvement. Crake, in Oryx and Crake, genetically engineers a new “type” of human
more suited to Earth’s changing environment and, as herbivores with their penchant for
war “edited out,” less likely to contribute to its degradation (Atwood 354). His primary
purpose, however, in creating the Crakers was to have “floor models” that display the
possible genetic manipulations parents could choose for their future children; it was
profit-driven (Atwood 363-64). The option to genetically engineer children nearly exists
now, a possibility that frighteningly harkens back to the Eugenics movement of the early
twentieth century, which ultimately spawned the Nazi program to create a “master race.”

12

For more information on the biological hazards of space, see: Phil Mckenna,
“Nanomaterial Turns Radiation Directly into Electricity,” New Scientist, 27 March 2008,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2832349/.
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But we humans are reticent to tamper with our DNA. Like with terraforming, we
can never be certain that alterations to our genome will manifest as we intend, and once
the gene is out there, there is nothing that we can do to stop its proliferation short of
impeding human rights and preventing reproduction; again, enacting a eugenic agenda.
Even if the genes did manifest as intended and our genetic manipulation met with riveting
success, it would take entire lifespans to reap the benefits of these changes unless, as in
Oryx and Crake, we commit genocide against the inferior, unmodified humans. Thus,
genetic engineering in humans leads to the potential creation of a genetic underclass that
becomes biologically—and thus, socially—subordinate to a genetic superclass or a
situation similar to that farcically envisioned by Aldous Huxley in Brave New World.
This is especially true if these genetic modifications are only affordable to the wealthy. If
genetic engineering leads to this extreme, only genocide of one side of the other could
rectify the situation. While I recognize the possible dystopian social stratification
inherent in mind uploading based on the possession of cyborg bodies of varying
quality—or no body at all—that these bodies are not extensions of or inherent to our
consciousness allows us to retain our ability to recognize the inferiority being imposed
upon us and to rebel against it. In a simulated reality in which we all have equal, infinite
access to our entire, collective knowledge, we might instead achieve a sort of
unparalleled egalitarianism. The blurring of boundaries between humans that a cyborg
existence facilitates, and its ability to divest humans of identity to transcend these borders
and unite humans based on affinity, as Donna Haraway posits, insists that we abandon,
rather than strengthen, demarcations in genetic identity. This blurring can undermine the
societal stratifications founded on gender, race, and sexuality, rather than strengthening
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them as genetic engineering would. Furthermore, reflecting humans’ historical shame of
the body, and for other reasons difficult to conceptualize and articulate, humans would
ultimately find it easier to abandon our flesh and our blood, to allow it to remain “pure,”
than to alter it.
Furthermore, just as is more ethical to abandon our biology than to alter it, it is
more ethical to abandon our planet than to continue altering it. Already, we have
devastated the diversity of life that exists on Earth; human activity has caused the loss of
100 to 1000 species per million per year (Dell’Amore). We torture many more in animal
agriculture and through medical and scientific research. Perhaps a world like the one
Rosemary envisions at the end of Karen Joy Fowler’s We Are All Completely Beside
Ourselves is the best solution for both animals and for humans; a world in which humans
are quarantined, and animals and nature are left to do as they well, unimpeded,
unimpacted, only observed. Though we initially accelerated climate change without
knowing, that we did not immediately lift our foot from the accelerator upon the
discovery of the havoc we are wreaking is unethical. But insofar as our intervention has
been damaging, we must evaluate the ethics and risk of intervening further. Given that it
was an extinction event that may have given rise to us, it may not necessarily be ethical to
prevent a sixth extinction if we discovered ourselves capable. We cannot anticipate the
consequences of impeding the natural cycle of the Earth; we may impede its ability to
regenerate and heal. We could prevent numerous other species with the potential for
intelligence from rising from the remnants of a human Earth.
Further Considerations & Science Fiction as Testing Grounds
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Ultimately, we are no more unsure of our ability to upload our minds to
computers than we are of our ability to terraform Earth, Mars, or any other planet, but at
least the consequences of mind uploading would be limited to our species. And of
course, there are consequences and dangerous implications inherent in all the possibilities
and potentialities of mind uploading that humans must explore. Moreover, all of these
potentialities and dangers depend on what exactly a world in which we have the ability to
upload our minds to computers and robotic bodies might look like. Exactly what
problems will it solve and to what extent? How will mind uploading and the blurring of
the distinction between human and machine affect our identity as individuals and as a
species? How will it affect the way we interact with one another or the way that we
explore the universe?
Before we can begin to imagine the subversive potential of virtual reality(ies), it is
important to locate what depictions of virtual reality and cyberspace already exist. Thus,
to answer these questions, the remainder of this project will explore existing
representations of virtual futures in science fiction to investigate how mind uploading
might manifest, what kinds of world(s) humans could and would create for themselves,
how it would change human culture and identity, and how it might endanger humans or
perpetuate the same dystopian pessimism currently assigned to human-driven climate
change. Using these visions as catalysts, this project will then draw upon critical theory
to explore the subversive potential of cyberspace and virtual futures, utilizing an
interdisciplinary approach to inform a Marxist and feminist standpoint.
Science fiction provides, as Genie Nicole Giaimo argues, a platform on which
“humanities scholars [can] intervene in the philosophical and practical conversations” of
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science, enabling them to “bring historical, political and cultural theories to bear” on
scientific concepts and innovations as well as their implementation. Science fiction is
inherently transdisciplinary, and works belonging to this genre function as models
through which we can hypothesize the cultural, political, economic, and philosophical
ramifications of scientific endeavors.
For example, William Gibson, anticipating the “emerging ecosystem sprouted by
computer networks,” prophetically coined the term “cyberspace” in his short story
“Burning Chrome” in 1982 (Popova). With the publication of his seminal novel
Neuromancer, Gibson pioneered a subsect of science fiction dubbed “cyberpunk,” and
popularized both the term “cyberspace” as well as the concept that it simultaneously
represented and anticipated: the World Wide Web. Gibson anticipated, and perhaps even
influenced, the invention of firewall software, which he referred to as ICE (intrusion
countermeasures electronics). However, while Gibson’s vision of cyberspace foresaw the
World Wide Web, it also projected beyond it, into a historicized future where cyberspace
is not only accessible, but habitable; where humans inhabit machines and machinery
penetrates human bodies, allowing technology to modify, perhaps even usurp, human
biology. Thirty-five years after Gibson coined “cyberspace,” Western culture has still not
shaken his particular vision of cyberspace, and his coinage has become synonymous with
the internet. Indeed, others have built upon Gibson’s vision, further engraining it into
cultural visions of the future.
Neuromancer, then, serves as a prime example of how science fiction, whether in
the form of novels, short stories, graphic novels, films, visual art, or video games, allows
writers and readers to envision, enact, investigate, and encourage or warn against
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potential futures. This project, therefore, will engage science fiction and cultural texts, in
addition to critical theory and scientific literature, to explore the potential of virtual
futures, and the ways in which virtual realities can undermine the polarizations of race
and gender to subvert the discourse of power that produces them.
Clarification of Terms
Cyberspace, while almost always connoting a complex web of data, possesses
many denotations. When Gibson first coined the term, he says that, “it was evocative and
essentially meaningless. It was suggestive of something, but had no real semantic
meaning…” To Gibson, it was little more than an “effective buzzword” (No Maps for
These Territories). Thus, the term became a blank canvas onto which others projected
their own notions of what they term cyberspace evoked. Don Slater once described
cyberspace as a sort of “social setting” that exists within computer space, digital space, “a
space of representation and communication”. Since then, the term has become a
synonym for the Internet, which has become a synonym for the World Wide Web. In
essence, “cyberspace” has become an umbrella term denoting any sort of digitized space
that houses networks of data, and often, that allows communication between distant and
disparate networks. For the purposes of this project, the term cyberspace will specifically
denote a digital space in which users can become immersed, with and in which they can
simulate physical interactions; a virtual environment capable of facilitating and
interactive experience either between the user and data or the user and other user via data.

II. Case Studies: Current Representations in Science Fiction
“Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced
daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation, by
children being taught mathematical concepts... A graphic
representation of data abstracted from the banks of every
computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity.
Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters
and constellations of data. Like city lights, receding.”
-William Gibson, Neuromancer
If it is possible for humans to inhabit virtual spaces, and if it is then probable that
we must if we wish to continue living, then the next question for humans to consider is
whether or not these virtual spaces will be worth living in. Virtual futures present a
unique opportunity for humans to exert previously unimaginable control over their future.
But who will exert this control and to what end? To whom will a virtual future belong?
While some critical theorists like Donna Haraway have exalted technology and its ability
to deconstruct the damaging binaries on which sexism, racism, colonialism, etc. operate,
most depictions of virtual reality and cyberspace are dystopian and strengthen, rather than
dissolve, the divisions between man and machine, technology and nature, or “the
natural.” To imagine the subversive potential of virtual futures and their ability to
undermine, rather than merely uphold, oppressive systems and ideologies, I will present
and respond to three texts that contain what I consider foundational depictions of virtual
reality and cyberspace: 1) the aforementioned Neuromancer by William Gibson, 2) The
Wachowskis’ The Matrix, and 3) Ernest Cline’s Ready Player One. In delineating the
depiction of each text, I will investigate the subversive power inherent or lacking in each
work and how they contribute to dialogues concerning human futures and the relationship
between human and machine.
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Neuromancer
Having already introduced and established its significance, I feel it is only
appropriate to take Neuromancer as our first catalyst for the investigation into the
potentialities of virtual space given its impact on both the genre of science fiction, and
specifically cyberpunk, as well as, and more pressingly for my purposes, on conceptions
and depictions of cyberspace. Because it has generated a plethora of scholarship and has
influenced nearly every text that succeeds it, Gibson’s depiction is fundamental to any
discourse regarding virtual reality and cyberspace as an inhabitable space.
In Gibson’s bleak historicized future, geographical boundaries are as blurred as
the boundaries between virtual and physical, “real” spaces. As a result of unmitigated
urban sprawl, nearly the entire east coast of the United States has congealed together into
a single urban center called the Boston-Atlanta Metropolitan Axis (BAMA), known
colloquially as The Sprawl. Yet, the blurring of the geographical boundaries, of city and
state limits, within the east coast strengthens the distinction between metropolitan and
non-metropolitan spaces. Enclosed in geodesic domes, The Sprawl possesses its own
climate and an artificial ever-gray sky, emancipating it from regular night and day cycles;
in essence, The Sprawl has become its own distinct world, or at least, a biome
emancipated from the world13 (Gibson 43).
For instance, Henry Dorsett Case, Gibson’s drug- and cyberspace-addicted
protagonist, communicates the incomprehensible size and busyness of the megacity by

Spaceship Earth, an attraction at Epcot that also serves as the park’s emblem, is
perhaps the most famous and recognizable geodesic dome. See: “Spaceship Earth,” Walt
Disney World, Siemens, https://disneyworld.disney.go.com/attractions/epcot/spaceshipearth/.
13
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rendering it in cybernetic language:
“Program a map to display frequency of data exchange, every thousand
megabytes a single pixel on a very large screen. Manhattan and Atlanta burn
solid white. Then they start to pulse, the rate of traffic threatening to overload
your simulation. Your map is about to go nova. Cool it down. Up your scale.
Each pixel a million megabytes. At a hundred million megabytes per second, you
begin to make out certain blocks in midtown Manhattan, outlines of hundredyear-old industrial parks ringing the old core of Atlanta…” (Gibson 43).
This passage serves three distinct purposes. First, it expresses the immensity of both
these future metropolises and of the volume of information available—or unavailable—to
any user of cyberspace, the volume of information penetrating any user. Second, if Case
is representative of the larger population, it demonstrates the linguistic dependence of this
future populace on cybernetic language to understand and conceptualize the physical
world around them. Third, insofar as The Sprawl necessitates a blurring of geographical
demarcations while originating a more rigid conceptual and physical distinction between
metropolitan and non-metropolitan spaces, this passage, in comparison to Gibson’s
description of cyberspace, complicates or blurs another binary opposition or demarcation
on which human conceptions of the world begin: the distinction between physical space
and cyberspace or “nonspace.” In what is one of the first, if not the first, descriptions of
cyberspace, Gibson writes:
“Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of
legitimate operators, in every nation, by children being taught mathematical
concepts... A graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks of every
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computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in
the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights,
receding” (Gibson 51).
Yet, even as this distinction is dissolved, it solidifies: a reversal of material form occurs.
Case and other characters “jack in” to this “hallucination” to become and interact with
pure data that is represented as palpable structures, vast, architecturally complex cities
bricked with data, and ultimately, to steal valuable data from mega-corporations that hold
more power than actual governments. They are released from their physical, material
form, from their “meat,” and become pure information, pure data, interacting with other
data. Pure data, information disembodied, is thus demonstrated to be inconceivable
without a physical analog. This analog underscores and makes palpable the distinction
between the physical and cyber spaces seeming blurred through their comparison.
The differences between The Sprawl and Night City further strengthen this
distinction. While Case considers BAMA his home, Case spent the majority of his time
as a “console cowboy,” or hacker, prior the events of the novel in Chiba City, Japan,
home to Night City. Night City is defined by the distinction that The Sprawl, which
exists somewhere in the space between night and day, defies. During the day, Night City
is dead and gray, empty of signs and signifiers, of features or character, but at night, the
city explodes into a diffusion of neon light and noise and crawls with criminals, pimps,
gangsters, and hitmen (Gibson 11). These criminals enact violence and perpetrate crimes
materially, within physical space, whereas the Panther Moderns of The Sprawl
manipulate data and perpetrate crime within cyberspace. Through their actions in
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cyberspace, the Panther Moderns avoid physical action by manipulating others in the
material world to act on their behalf.
Spatial oppositions are not the only demarcations strengthened within Gibson’s
novel. While Donna Haraway imagines the potential of technology to disintegrate the
rigid boundaries based on reifications of gender and race, Lauraine Leblanc, in her article
“Razor Girls: Genre and Gender in Cyberpunk Fiction,” argues that Neuromancer
upholds, rather than upends, constricting constructions of gender. She reads
Neuromancer alongside two other literary texts, Mindplayers by Pat Cadigan and Glass
Houses by Laura J. Mixon, to investigate gender and how (or if) women can use
technology to undermine male domination in cyberpunk fiction, centering on the
“breakdown of categories through the use of technology which is at the root of cyberpunk
authors’ rethinking of gender” (Leblanc 3).
Specifically interrogating the representations of each novel’s main female
protagonist, Leblanc argues that the cyborg characters of cyberpunk fiction “transform
gender” in two ways: through “transgendered representations,” which fail to revise
gender, or through a “radical change of subjectivity, of embodiment, and of gender.”
While technological and surgical implants allow her to emulate masculine qualities (i.e.,
toughness, quickness, and strength) that typically elude “natural,” unaugmented female
bodies, Gibson’s Molly thus embodies this sort of transgendered representation. Indeed,
because she lacks typical “womanly” attributes, she evades categorization as either a
“whore” or a “Madonna” (Leblanc 3). Furthermore, she rewrites the “whore” image and
narrative by using the money she made as a prostitute to afford the augmentations that
allow her to now hire herself out (i.e. to sell her body) as a mercenary and bodyguard
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rather than a prostitute. However, Molly, just as she is no longer human, is only
nominally a woman; it is only through her assumption of a male role that any “revision”
takes place, rendering it not revision, but mere role-reversal, which ultimately functions
to uphold the gender it seeks to revise through technological augmentation (Leblanc 4).
The way in which Molly and Case perpetrate their cybercrimes upholds both
physical/cyber, or spatial, as well as male/female, or gendered, divides. Further
instantiating male/female as mind/body, as many theorists and philosophers throughout
history have done,14 Case jacks in to the matrix to execute his portion of their mutual task
within “the nonspace of the mind,” while Molly physically breaks in to whatever
databanks or corporations Case is hacking in to. Case even inhabits Molly’s body
through simstim (i.e. “simulated stimulation” that allows somebody jacked into the
matrix to tap in to another person’s physical experiences), seeing and hearing all that
Molly does and experiencing the brutal beatings and pain she suffers and that ultimately
forces Case out of Molly’s body because it is too intense to withstand (Gibson 63). Thus,
Molly becomes pure flesh, doing only as Case tells her, and acting as a receptacle for
Case’s consciousness and will. Indeed, when Molly works as a prostitute, she possesses
an augmentation that allows her mind to go blank so that she does not remember what
transpires between herself and her clients; she become pure flesh, pure body.
Additionally, Gibson’s text explicitly values the mind over the body, and thus the
masculine over the feminine. Case continually derides the body, referring to flesh as a
prison, and when he jacks into the matrix for the first time after his operation renders him
able to do so, he revels in “bodiless exaltation” (Gibson 6): “And somewhere he was

14

Freud and psychoanalysts who build on Freudian psychoanalysis, for example.
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laughing in a white-painted loft, distant fingers caressing the deck, tears of release
streaking his face” (Gibson 52). Furthermore, to the extent that both mind and body are
required to complete all of Molly and Case’s missions, the divisions between mind and
body, between real and virtual and material and immaterial, are accentuated.
Finally, Leblanc concludes that, of the three texts that she examines, only
Mixon’s Glass Houses radically revises gender in that the female protagonist can shift
her subjectivity from machine to human, and from masculine to feminine, and back
again. Thus, she traverses and occupies multiple consciousnesses, multiple identities,
multiple genders, while consolidating them under a single consciousness, or a single “I.”
She thereby collapses any “artificial division of concepts into dichotomies,” while
pluralizing the basis of her identity (Leblanc 6). Only Glass Houses rewrites or revises
traditional female narratives based on the masculine/feminine dichotomy, thus liberating
the protagonist from the restrictions inherent therein. Though Gibson fails to articulate a
cyborg existence that possesses revisionary powers, it is important to note that Laura J.
Mixon is able to conceive of a cyborg existence, of a virtual existence, that does.
Thus, cyberspace in Neuromancer strengthens the very distinctions that Haraway
posits cyborg existence has the potential to blur. Rather than a revolutionary existence,
David Brande reads the cyborg, particularly Gibson’s cyborg, as a symptom of the larger
late-capitalist structure that Gibson’s novel expresses. He maintains that the “denaturing
of the subject” must be understood as a consequence of the “historical-economic
transformations,” the isomorphic shift and changes, “described by Marx and Engels…as
characteristic of bourgeois socioeconomic life;” i.e., the of “constant revolutionizing of
production,” and thus of the “relations of production” and thereby “the whole relation of
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society” (Brande 512). Technoscience, the cyborg and cyberspace, is thus another
iteration of the “coercive [internal] laws of the market,” of this constant revolutionizing,
and Gibson’s characters’ struggle to keep up with technology epitomizes the struggle to
keep up with the internal laws of the market, the perpetual transformation and
revolutionizing of the modes of production, and concomitantly, social conditions; i.e., a
struggle to adapt to “the rapidity of cultural change” (Brande 514). The first thing Case
sees when he jacks in to the Matrix for the first time after his operation are the
cornerstones of capitalism as the virtual world unfurls and whirls past him, and a sense of
unattainability overwhelms him:
“And [cyberspace] flowed, flowered for him, fluid neon origami trick, the
unfolding of his distanceless home, his country, transparent 3D chessboard
extending to infinity. Inner eye opening to the stepped scarlet pyramid of the
Eastern Seabord Fission Authority burning beyond the green cubes of Mitsubishi
Bank of America, and high and very far away he saw the spiral arms of military
systems, forever beyond his reach” (Gibson 52).
To Brande, cyborgs are the very thing that allows capitalism to wreak havoc on
the world and on its subjects. He explicates “the ‘interpellation’ of the cyborg,” arguing
that the cyborg is “the ideological ‘dream-work’ of [Gibson’s] fiction;” that they are the
reflection or representation of the ideological fantasy of cyberspace, which answers
capitalism’s “immanent contradiction,” “the very source of its power,” and its incentive
for constantly revolutionizing the means of production: that “its limit is its impetus for
development” (Brande 528; 536). In that it becomes a means to “reterritorialize the
deterritorialized flows of advanced capitalism,” cyberspace becomes a new frontier, a
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new New World, but one of limitless space, limitless expansion (Brande 536).
Cyberspace thus becomes a commercial, capitalist, rather than revisionary, realm.
Furthermore, this ideological fantasy of limitless space and endless expansion,
“does the essential ideological work of constructing (cyborg) subjects who are invested in
an ‘objective belief’ in [cyber]space, who will structure their behavior as if this fantasy
was true, whether or not they “believe” it theoretically” (Brande 532). Insofar as
cyberspace also symbolizes future opportunity, much like the “Old West” myth did, it
becomes the “jouissance of the cyborg” (Brande 532). Building on Žižek’s definition of
ideology, Brande argues that this is the ideological fantasy that structures the
“’impossible’ totality” of Neuromancer’s reality, the basis on which this “reality”
functions, and which constitutes the nature of the cyborg’s identity (Brande 526).
Ready Player One
Welcome to the “Ontologically Anthropocentric Sensory Immersive Simulation,”
more commonly known as the OASIS, Ernest Cline’s vision for humanity’s future. Aptly
named, the OASIS in Cline’s near-future functions as a refuge into which humans around
the globe in 2044 escape. In many ways, his analog to Gibson’s matrix, the OASIS
supersedes its predecessor. Just as Gibson’s matrix “has its roots in primitive arcade
games” (Gibson 51), the OASIS began as a massively multiplayer online roleplaying
game (MMORPG), and while it has retained its initial function, it has also evolved into a
multinational virtual society on which “real,” physical society depends. Even more than
Gibson’s matrix, the OASIS, though palpably a copy that builds on its original, has
displaced reality in an undeniably Baudrillardian15 way. However, the OASIS does not
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See Jean Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simulation.
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aim to replicate the physical world exactly so as to be indistinguishable from it. Part of
the great appeal of the OASIS is that it is not a replication of the energy and resourcedepleted, poverty-ridden world that its users live in. Users do not have to inhabit the
virtual space merely as faithful digital copies of themselves, performing the same
mundane tasks that they do in the “real” world. Instead, users can wield swords, guns,
arrows, and amulets; purchase private planets and construct personal sanctuaries; craft
spaceships to fly between planets, discover new worlds, complete quests; vanquish foes
and battle monsters; and users can become heroes and heroines. They can become almost
everything that they cannot in real life, though often at the expense of “real” roles.
Yet, OASIS users still cannot escape the mundane, even the contemptible, aspects
of “real” life. While Wade, Cline’s protagonist who is known as Parzival within the
OASIS, can use the system to overcome his circumstances, others, like his mother, are
limited to the same jobs as they would be in “real” life. To make end’s meat, Wade’s
mother, Loretta, worked “two full-time OASIS jobs, one as a telemarketer, the other as an
escort in an online brothel” (Cline 15). While Loretta’s job as a virtual escort improves
upon Molly’s job as a “meat puppet” in Neuromancer, in which clients essentially rented
her body while her mind went blank, Loretta’s job, which requires her to talk dirty to her
clients is still demeaning, and evidences the persistence of misogyny even against virtual
bodies (Gibson 142). Though her body is relieved of the work of an escort, her mind is
not. Furthermore, because Loretta had to work these jobs within the OASIS to provide
for herself and Wade, she is unable to fulfill any roles outside of the OASIS, e.g. her role
as Wade’s mother. Because she is too busy fighting for her and her son’s economic
survival, programs within the OASIS raise Wade; she often relies on these to distract her
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son while she performs her duties as an escort. Insofar as the OASIS becomes a space in
which it Loretta is demeaned, it can no longer function as a refuge, and Loretta turns to
drugs to escape the degradation of her mind within the OASIS and of her body, through
economic strife and unfulfilled basic human needs, without.
Certainly, those economically limited outside of the OASIS are economically
limited within it; just like real-life, almost everything has a price. Clothes and
accessories, for example, still function as markers of status and wealth, and so social
mobility within the OASIS is inextricably tied to economic status without. While
attending school within the OASIS drastically decreases the severity of the bullying, at
least the physical bullying, that Wade experiences, other kids with whom he attends
virtual school, like Todd13, still tease him about the “free default skin” that Wade’s
avatar wears, and Todd13’s snobbery is linked to his “expensive designer skin” (Cline
29-30). This not only replicates exactly the economic component of social relations, but
perpetuates the economic condition of the labor class, insofar as they are now trading
material labor for immaterial goods, goods which only benefit them within the OASIS,
rather than in “real” life. Rather than purchasing clothes to protect their bodies and keep
them warm, laborers who have access to the OASIS funnel their labor power into a
system powered by their exploitation, which ensures they never amass physical capital,
never have the means to escape or even better their material situation. Thus, the OASIS
ingeniously answers the question of how to continuously expand, develop, and profit in a
resource-depleted world. Thus, much or all of Brande’s analysis of Neuromancer applies
to Ready Player One, especially insofar as the OASIS serves to “reterritorialize the
deterritorialized flows of advanced capitalism” (Brande 536). The OASIS may
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exemplify Brande’s analysis more so even than Gibson’s cyborg characters or his vision
of cyberspace. Certainly, it exemplifies and upholds my position that capitalism will
serve as the impetus for any virtual future, and that its ability to answer, again, to
capitalism’s “immanent contradiction,” that “its limit is its impetus for development”
renders it the most likely solution to the threat of climate change (Brande 528; 536).
However, the efficacy of the solution, whether it will be palliative or restorative, depends
on how this solution might manifest and if it can be divorced from the impetus for its
development; i.e. the salvation of capitalism.
Furthermore, while at first the narrative of Wade, an archetypal “underdog,”
overcoming immeasurable odds to become a millionaire by exploiting the very thing
meant to placate him and others like him may seem revolutionary, even superficial
analysis reveals it as a simple reincarnation of the “American Dream.” Wade is able to
overcome his circumstances, not by overthrowing the system that oppresses and exploits
him, but by conforming to it entirely. The contest that OASIS creator James Halliday
devises, in which OASIS users search for a hidden egg by solving riddles and completing
quests based on a sort of “cultural canon” assembled by Halliday, is essentially an
exercise in cultural capital. At first this may seem in some way revolutionary, especially
insofar as egg hunters, “gunters,” are literally pitted against a megacorporation who
employ millions of avatars in pursuit of the egg, the reward for which is millions of
dollars and control of the OASIS. However, it is the hunt’s reliance on this cultural
canon/capital that undermines its revolutionary potential, its potential to mobilize a revolt
against dominant hegemony, insofar as it merely rebrands the dominant hegemony. As
Megan Condis argues, “Ready Player One reproduces the social system that produced it,
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a social system in which true archetypal geeks are modeled on their progenitors: white
males” (Condis 9). Insofar as this cultural canon is the text on which all of Halliday’s
tasks and tests are based, a canon most familiar to Western white males insofar as it
reflects their cultural identity, it perpetuates the hegemony of white males even if in
different terms. It may allow Wade to overcome his lack of economic capital to discover
the egg, but only insofar as he embodies this white male ideal, that he is a product of this
very capital.
Thus, Wade figuratively “pulls himself up by his bootstraps” by spending nearly
every waking moment studying the cultural canon that is natural to and representative of
him as a white male. In an innovative new rendition of the American Dream, but a
rendition all the same, he overcomes his meager economic standing through hard work
and devotion. But, in a pertinent reflection of the reality of this ideological snare, his
identity as a white male is requisite to his ability to achieve this dream. “Aech,” a black
lesbian, hides her identity beneath a white male avatar in order to support herself as a
professional sponsored gamer. Like Gibson’s Molly, she is a “transgendered
representation” insofar as she emulates masculine qualities rather than subverting the
distinction between feminine and masculine or blurring racial boundaries. She explains
to Wade that:
“Her [Aech’s] mother, Marie, worked from home, in an online data-processing
center. In Marie’s opinion, the OASIS was the best thing that had ever happened
to both women and people of color. From the very start, Marie had used a white
male avatar to conduct all her online business, because of the marked difference it
made in how she was treated and the opportunities she was given.
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When Aech first logged into the OASIS, she followed her mother’s advice and
created a Caucasian male avatar…A few years later, when she started attending
school online, her mother lied about her daughter’s race and gender on the
application.” (Cline 320)
Furthermore, the rest of Cline’s main characters and the final contenders for Halliday’s
egg keep the appearance of their avatars identical to their physical selves, fixing only
their flaws. For example, Wade makes his avatar’s nose smaller, his body thinner, and
does not recreate his acne, while Art3mis’ avatar is identical to her physical appearance,
except that she does not replicate the birthmark that stretches across half of her face
(Cline 28 and 291). While Daito and Shoto look nothing like their avatars, they at least
retain their sex and ethnicity. Aech, whom Wade continues to refer to as “he” within the
OASIS suggesting that the Aech he has met in real life and the one he has known for
years virtually are not the same individual, is the only one of Cline’s main characters that
drastically changes her appearance so that it is no longer representative of her identity as
a black female, suggesting that these aspects of her identity are, in themselves, flaws to
be corrected.
Insofar as a “real” virtual reality of this magnitude would likely have its origin in
video games (e.g. simulation games like The Sims franchise, Runescape, Guild Wars,
World of Warcraft, etc.), and indeed, current virtual reality innovations are funded by
their application to video games and films, it is fair to assume that it would replicate
gaming culture and the culture of those who can afford the initial expensive investments
in virtual reality systems. While perhaps the canon would eventually expand, as has
happened with the literary canon, it would still be founded in the dominant hegemony of

36
global, capitalist, white patriarchy. Additions to the cultural canon representative of the
rest of a virtual reality’s inhabitants would be, as they are in real life, peripheral.
Thus, just as in Neuromancer, this virtual future does not blur any boundaries so
much as it reinforces them to detrimental ends. If all people of color and women
concealed and abandoned their identities in favor of more privileged identities, then those
identities would eventually cease to exist, along with others that are dependent on gender
and race. While the erasure of all essential identities is not necessarily damaging, and
indeed may actually be beneficial, as Haraway argues, the erasure of certain identities in
favor of privileged identities, or certainly, a single identity is unquestionably a dystopian
prospect akin to the eugenics movement’s project to create a master race. The novel
further accentuates the importance of white male identity in achieving the American
Dream or overcoming economic strife in that, if it were not for Aech’s gaming career, she
never would have been able to afford to make the progress that she did in the hunt for
Halliday’s egg, as it costs money to acquire items and to travel to the different planets
across which the hunt is spread in the OASIS. Furthermore, out of the diverse cast of the
main contenders for Halliday’s egg, it is the white male in both real space and virtual
space, Wade/Parzival, that achieves this gamified “Holy Grail.” While the possibilities
within the OASIS seem endless, it is still a program with social, cultural, and economic
parameters as hardcoded into its virtual world as they are in the “real” physical world.
These parameters are further concretized through Cline’s privileging of the
construction of the heterosexual couple above any discourse concerning the changes
Parzival, Art3mis, or Aech could make to the OASIS to ensure that it is accessible and
equitable to all, or how they would utilize the reward money to “fix” Earth, as Art3mis
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had planned to do if she won, or to build a rocket ship to leave the planet, as Wade had
considered. Despite Art3mis’s noble and safeguarded incentive to win the egg, this
prospect vanishes from the end of the novel once Wade has won the egg with the help of
his friends, which inspires him to split the winning equally among the final contenders.
Insofar as the final four could not have reached the end without the help of the gunters
that gathered to defend them against the megacorporation Innovative Online Industries
(IOI), Wade might logically extend a portion of the prize to them, as well. The ultimate
dismissal of the gunter community’s collective action to prevent the corporate takeover of
the OASIS eerily echoes the continual dismissal workers’ resistance by labor, socialist,
and other party leaders who betray the collective resistance of workers by accepting only
palliative, rather than revolutionary or revisionary, reforms for personal gain.16
The Matrix
The Matrix franchise, written and directed by the Wachowskis, is perhaps the
most popularly familiar depiction of virtual reality and mind uploading. These films
portray a vastly different impetus for simulated reality’s development than either Ready
Player One’s OASIS or Neuromancer’s matrix. The Wachowskis’ matrix, the simulation
to which humans are connected, is not a direct product of capitalism. Rather, it is its byproduct, a product at a remove, in that it is the consequence of the humans’ creation of
artificial intelligence. In their conceptualization of the technological singularity, the
Wachowskis posit a future in which robots have overthrown their human creators.
Because they attempted to disrupt the machines’ solar power by blanketing the sky with

For detailed examples of the demeaning of laborer’s resistance, see: Sharon Smith,
Subterranean Fires: A History of Working-Class Radicalism in the United States,
Haymarket Books, 2006.
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thick clouds, humans now function as batteries for the robots who harness their thermal
energy and bioelectricity. To prevent revolt, they lock humans’ minds into a simulated
reality, completely obscuring their true reality, while their bodies generate energy within
womb-like pods.
Needless to say, The Matrix films depict perhaps the most dystopian
conceptualization of virtual reality of the three examples presented in this paper. Yet, it
simultaneously posits a wealth of subversive potential inherent in simulations. Like the
OASIS, the matrix’s purpose is to delude an entire species into submission, docility, and
obedience, though this purpose was not intended by Halliday, the creator of the OASIS.
In this way, the Matrix comes to embody Louis Althusser’s notion of ideology, as
ideology’s purpose is to make its subjects complicit in their own control and surveillance
so as to exert control over subjects without provoking revolt.17 When Morpheus first
explains the Matrix to Neo, he references the institutions that Althusser claims function
as ideological state apparatuses, such as governments, churches, popular culture, and
media:
“The Matrix is everywhere. It is all around us. Even now in this very room. You
can see it when you look out your window or when you turn on your television.
You can feel it when you go to work, when you go to church, when you pay your
taxes. It is the world that has been pulled over your eyes to blind you from the
truth.”
“What truth?”
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“That you are a slave, Neo. Like everyone else you were born into bondage, born
into a prison that you cannot smell or taste or touch. A prison for your mind.”
(The Matrix)
The Matrix, then, literalizes ideology. Ideology, like the matrix, imprisons the
mind to the extent that it predates the subject and informs subject formation. We are, in
Louis Althusser’s vocabulary, interpellated. There is no outside of ideology; all is
contained within it. The very languages that we speak and use to conceive all of
existence are produced by and reproduce ideology. The Guardian recently published an
article about “An artificial intelligence tool that has revolutionized the ability of
computers to interpret everyday language [and which] has been shown to exhibit striking
gender and racial biases,” which suggests that any artificial intelligences we create will
form the same ideological precepts as whatever culture produces them (Devlin). Every
notion about ourselves derives from an ideological construct. We do not produce culture,
but rather, culture is inscribed on our bodies and minds, and we reproduce it; we are born
into it and are slaves to it, just as humans are to the Matrix. Thus, Morpheus aptly
describes what remains outside of the Matrix, and thus outside of ideology, as “the desert
of the real” (The Matrix). The figurative frontiers outside of ideology, of The Matrix, are
disordered, chaotic, and barren.
The totalizing nature of the matrix, however, renders it slightly less insidious than
the virtual spaces of either Ready Player One or Neuromancer, which exist as extensions
of realities so entrenched in oppressive ideologies as to become inseparable from them;
indeed, it is less insidious than the ideological institutions that currently exist. While at
first the totalizing simulation of the matrix seems a bleaker, more hopeless prospect than
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a virtual future in which users voluntarily jack in and out of a simulation, The Matrix’s
all-encompassing nature localizes all oppressive forces into a single, recognizable system.
Once humans swallow the red pill, the simulation is revealed in its entirety. Ideological
apparatuses and physical repressive apparatuses congeal into one undeniable locus
against which humans are able to revolt, if they so choose. Unlike the many,
proliferating, entangled and intangible ideological apparatuses that pervade and constitute
our “reality,” the localization of all human control to a single apparatus, The Matrix,
allows humans to trace any notion taken for granted as true, any notion that defies
questioning, back to this single locus of control and to reveal it as a method of control
rather than an essential truth. The Matrix is thus a double-edged sword: we could all be
living within The Matrix and not know it, and we would have very little way of knowing
it; but if we came to know it, we could know all and defy all systems of control.
There is, then, a sort of power inherent in The Matrix for humans, despite its use
against them, and this power is derived from its complete usurpation of and separation
from reality, from the fact that it is no longer dependent on or informed by the “real”
world. This assertion may at first seem misinformed, as The Matrix replicates exactly the
world at the end of the twentieth century, just before “…all of mankind was united in
celebration. [Marveling] at our own magnificence as we gave birth to AI…A singular
consciousness that spawned an entire race of machines” (The Matrix). The Matrix thus
replicates the ideology of that period, a period whose reality is as deeply entrenched in
ideology as any other. Yet, because that reality no longer has a concrete, physical, “real”
analog, because it no longer reciprocally interacts with the “real,” it is not obliged to it.
The simulation is not founded in any “essential truth(s);” it has no basis in nature that,
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once humans swallow the red pill and see that their reality is constructed, confuses them
as to which pieces of The Matrix are real and which are simulation. Paradoxically, The
Matrix’s subversive potential is that which allows it to obscure reality: its constructed
nature and complete rejection of reality.
“Reality” is the basis for essentialism. The belief in Reality substantiates the
claims that disparate ideological beliefs are all essentially true, that they all are embedded
in nature, that they are not simply beliefs, but “fact.” Yet, our very ability to comprehend
and convey fact is both obscured and limited by our very language.
Inversely to The Matrix, then, rejecting Reality is the only way of rejecting
ideology and of reclaiming our subjectivity and the process of subject formation. By
choosing to permanently remove ourselves from Reality and all of its constituents,
including our own bodies (and our planet and physical universe) on which
Reality/Ideology inscribes itself, and choosing to occupy a reality that never obscures but
makes always already apparent its non-reality, its simulative and virtual nature, we may
reach the kernel of true selfhood that Butler and Althusser posit does not exist, in that a
subject is always already interpellated and cannot predate culture’s inscription.
Of course, this is somewhat optimistic; humans would have to create this reality
insofar as it is separate from and supplants nature. Thus, virtual futures cannot escape
ideology. Still, the recognition that all that exists within a simulation is ideology would
allow humans to reject the ideology, to bend it and blur it. When humans in The Matrix
swallow the red pill, when they become aware of the non-reality of the Matrix, they can
then learn how to manipulate the physics on which the simulation is based, to bend its
laws, and ultimately, to overcome the agents that enforce its laws and become impervious
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to the mental and bodily penetration of ideology. Neo literally prevents its penetration
when he stops the bullets that three agents fire at him, leaving them to levitate in midair.
He plucks a bullet from the volley, and after dropping it, the rest fall to the ground.
When he looks around, the simulation is revealed for what it truly is: mere sequences of
code. He then infiltrates the bodies of the agents capable of infiltrating any digital
manifestation of any human—thus, reversing subject and agent/object, penetrator and
penetrated—and destroys him from within (The Matrix).
While the simulation cannot escape the ideology out of which is what created, the
recognition of the simulation as ideology allows humans to overcome its constrictions
and prescriptions and to not merely replace them with some other ideological
mechanisms, but to rewrite the ideology individually, multiplying and pluralizing
meaning and meaning making. Yet, a simulated reality also renders possible the
reconciliation of the individual and collective, the distance between which has
increasingly polarized humanity since the Reformation.18 Neo’s last words underscore
this multiplicity and the role of the individual within a collective world:
“I know you're out there. I can feel you now. I know that you're afraid... you're
afraid of us. You're afraid of change. I don't know the future. I didn't come here
to tell you how this is going to end. I came here to tell you how it's going to
begin. I'm going to hang up this phone, and then I'm going to show these people
what you don't want them to see. I'm going to show them a world without you. A
world without rules and controls, without borders or boundaries. A world where
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anything is possible. Where we go from there is a choice I leave to you.” (The
Matrix)
Real Vs. Virtual
Despite their differences, these texts share one fundamental tenet: the exaltation
of the return to the “real” over life in virtual spaces. Yet, each text also shows its
protagonists returning to a bleak, ravaged, dying and degraded reality that, as of the ends
of the novel or film, they have no means of escaping. After Wade/Parzival possesses the
egg—officially lifting him and his friends from the clutches of poverty both within the
OASIS and without—resurrects his friend’s killed avatars, and physically meets his longtime virtual sweetheart Art3mis/Samantha in Ready Player One, he states: “It occurred to
me then that I had absolutely no desire to log back in to the OASIS” (Cline 372). Despite
his world being in ruins while people are living in trailers that they share with twenty
other people in stacks twenty trailers high, Wade, having risen above such a living
situation himself and having found love, no longer requires the OASIS. His rejection of
the OASIS after stumbling upon staggering wealth reveals Cline’s virtual reality as
merely palliative; a distraction for the poor, oppressed, and hopeless.
Likewise, though the mind is privileged over the body in Neuromancer, Case
simultaneously privileges the real over the virtual: when Neuromancer attempts to seduce
Case into living inside of the matrix with his dead but possibly digitally resurrected
girlfriend, Linda Lee, Case chooses to return to the physical world. The novel’s ending
does, however, suggest a sort of ambivalence about his return. While logged in to the
matrix, Case glimpses himself, his girlfriend, and Neuromancer, suggesting that
Neuromancer created a copy of Case that now lives in the matrix indefinitely. Thus,
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Case exists in both spaces, as both a physical and virtual entity. Though he chooses to
return to the “real,” he also cannot escape the simulation. Furthermore, once resigned to
the real world, Case undergoes surgery to restore his body’s ability to metabolize and so
be affected by drugs; he still seeks to escape from the physical conditions of the world,
but through tangible, physical means.
At the end of The Matrix trilogy, humans are given the choice to leave The
Matrix, and while the movie seems to favor a return to the real, it fails to acknowledge
how humans would adapt to the environmentally devastated world that they are
inheriting. Certainly, the humans involved in the overthrow of the machines celebrate the
human species’ release from captivity via The Matrix at the end of the trilogy, but the
physical world is still in shambles and the sky still obscured, leaving the viewer to
wonder whether or not the Earth is capable of producing a food source abundant enough
to feed a possible influx of humans who will require a transitional period as well as
muscle regeneration. Humanity, collectively becoming aware of their existence, will
have to create new systems of organization amidst the chaos of a population explosion.
The Matrix rejoices in the truth unveiled at the revelation of the “real” and in human
freedom and choice without acknowledging the consequences of the return to the
physical world. Thus, in its exaltation of the “desert of the real” over cyberspace, the
film devalues virtual existence despite also offering a reading of cyberspace as a tool to
subvert systems of oppression, to overcome constrictive ideology/Reality.
While these depictions of cyberspace ultimately disparage or devalue cyber
existence, each of these texts shows us what virtual reality cannot be if it is to improve
our lives rather than simply save them. Additionally, they provide glimpses of what
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characteristics a simulated reality with subversive potential and the potential to create a
positive, progressive future might possess. While both Neuromancer and Ready Player
One depict cyberspace as a product of late capitalism that inures humans to the violence
of the marketplace as well as the environmental degradation that threatens their
wellbeing, Cline suggests some ways in which a virtual future could improve individual
conditions within in a world ravaged by poverty.
The OASIS, for example, allows everybody with access to a console access to an
education that far surpasses that which they are able to receive in physical classrooms.
Teachers, no longer charged with acting as disciplinarians or babysitters, can spend their
time actually teaching (Cline 47). Because the schools are software, they are not
financially constrained or even beholden to the laws of physics and so become “grand
palace[s] of learning,” with “polished marble hallways, cathedral-like classrooms, zero-g
gymnasiums, and virtual libraries containing every (school-board approved) book ever
written” (Cline 31-32). Even so, teachers may spend little time within the pseudophysical confines of the classroom because of the ease of taking students on virtual field
trips that are far more stimulating than simple lectures. Cline presents a vivid example of
what a day inside a virtual classroom could look like:
“During our World History lesson that morning, Mr. Avenovich loaded up a
stand-alone simulation so that our class could witness the discovery of King Tut’s
tomb by archaeologists in Egypt in 1922 AD…
In my next class, Biology, we traveled through the human heart and watched it
pumping from the inside…
In Art class we toured the Louvre while all of our avatars wore silly berets.
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In my Astronomy class, we visited each of Jupiter’s moons. We stood on the
volcanic surface of Io while our teacher explained how the moon had originally
formed. As our teacher spoke to us, Jupiter loomed behind her, filling half the
sky, its Great Red Spot churning slowly just over her left shoulder. Then she
snapped her fingers and we were standing on Europa, discussing the possibility of
extraterrestrial life beneath the moon’s icy crust.” (Cline 48).
Schools even issue OASIS consoles and visors so that no student’s financial standing
impedes their access to an education. Furthermore, geographic location, school funding,
access to materials, etc. does not impede the quality of their education.
Unfortunately, this type of education is still restricted to school-age children who
meet a certain grade-point average, though this average is relatively low. With virtual
libraries and educational simulations available to all OASIS users, everybody with access
to the OASIS would have access to most media and books. Thus, regardless of race,
nationality, sex, disability, etc., anybody with access to the OASIS has within their reach
the whole of human knowledge. If somebody has a disability that might otherwise render
them unable to work, they can assume a digital body within the OASIS and attend
meetings, more easily hold and read books, handle and organize information, etc.
Despite geographic isolation, nobody would have to be socially isolated or rendered
unable to attend school or work. Additionally, while natural landscapes are fading from
existence, marred by environmental degradation as population growth causes urban
sprawl to encroach on nature preserves, simulations like the OASIS would allow users
geographically isolated from nature and natural landscapes to interact with the natural
world. For example, while eating lunch, Wade remains logged in to the OASIS as
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“sitting in the green fields bordering the school, staring at the scenery while [he]
munched on a protein bar,” “beat staring at the inside of [his] hideout,” an old van buried
beneath a junk heap (Cline 47). Recent studies have found that representations of nature
are almost as therapeutic as nature itself: “Like other researchers, Ulrich has found that
simply viewing representations of nature can help. In a study at a Swedish hospital, for
instance, he found that heart surgery patients in intensive care units could reduce their
anxiety and need for pain medication by looking at pictures depicting trees and water”
(Clay).
Access to material, planets, and simulations within the OASIS is limited,
however, by social class. While access to the OASIS is free, transportation within the
OASIS is not. Gregarious Simulation Systems (GSS) draws their revenue primarily from
teleportation fees and charging for virtual fuel. Wade, for example, cannot leave Ludus,
a planet comprised primarily of various schools, until he attains the first key, and in doing
so, also attains valuable items and OASIS credit. Teleportation costs more than fuel
because traveling within the OASIS is also dangerous, and traveling from one safe planet
to another requires crossing into combat zones, where users risk allowing other users or
non-player characters (NPCs) to kill their avatars. When a user’s avatar dies, that user
loses all items and OASIS credit, as well as any experience they have gained. Because
OASIS currency is more stable than any real currency, death within the OASIS is
devastating. Thus, users who cannot afford to travel within the OASIS reap few of the
benefits of the virtual universe. Furthermore, the quality of a user’s OASIS experience
depends on the quality of a user’s haptic technology and internet speed, both of which
require sometimes substantial monetary investment. Even though the OASIS improves
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quality of life in some small ways, it functions largely as a recapitulation of capitalist
social organization, as users are hierarchized based on class, which in turn reflects and
reinforces their class standing outside of the OASIS. Thus, before we can further explore
the possible benefits of living within a virtual reality, we must consider whether
cyberspace can accommodate or function as an alternative to current political systems
and other systems of organization.

III. Virtual Futures: Structuring Power
“I'm going to show them a world without you. A world
without rules and controls, without borders or boundaries.
A world where anything is possible. Where we go from
there is a choice I leave to you.” (The Matrix)
“We do not need a totality in order to work well. The
feminist dream of a common language, like all dreams for a
perfectly true language, of perfectly faithful naming of
experience, is a totalizing and imperialist one. In that
sense, dialectics too is a dream language, longing to resolve
contradiction.” – Donna Haraway

As Ready Player One proves, the meager palliative benefits of the OASIS can
only superficially improve the conditions of its users. As The Matrix proves, virtual
reality can only radically revise human existence if it demands a substrate shift, a divorce
of itself and its users from physical reality and the ideology that founds itself on this
reality. Without a radical revision of human social organization, living conditions will
continue much as they are. Supplemental virtual reality, much like small political
reforms that effect small, gradual changes to the system but fail to address the failure of
the system as a whole, can only alleviate suffering enough to placate sufferers, to distract
them from demanding change. Thus, before we begin to explore the myriad ways virtual
reality can alleviate and enhance human experience, we must first explore potential
manifestations of virtual reality that can affect the ways in which we structure power and
how it might affect the structure and organization of power. Without a radical revision
power discourse, all other benefits of virtual reality become superficial.
In a recent Big Think video, Slovoj Žižek posits that the recent wave of populism
in both the United States and elsewhere results from the vacuum in the political left after
the fall of communism. He states, “I would sell my mother into slavery to see a movie
49
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called V for Vendetta Part II,” proposing a sequel to the film in which English citizens
collectively gather against the state and overtake parliament. “Okay, guys,” Žižek
continues, “People took over. What would they have done a day later? How would they
reorganize the power? …How would they restructure the power?” (Žižek). Žižek draws
on this film to illustrate his point that “…the ultimate cause of all of this populism and so
on…is the left doesn’t have a model; it’s all empty praises. People should decide more
through democracy, blah, blah, blah, but what does it mean? …How [do we] re-organize
the state?” (Žižek). Having established the foundation of his argument, Žižek advances
two critical points.
First, while the left advocates for a diffusion of power, Žižek warns that “The
majority is not automatically right,” nor does it share the principles of that same political
left that argues for the majority’s empowerment. Furthermore, that majority’s opinions
may be so disparate and diverse that the “majority” may constitute only a small portion of
a populace; there may never be, as I argue in the introduction, a significant portion of a
population in agreement. Here, Žižek draws on a right-wing critique of Angela Merkel
after she decided to welcome one million immigrants into Germany, despite the
resistance of the majority: “Where is her sense of democracy?” (Žižek). To Žižek,
Merkel’s actions and the resultant criticism demonstrates that democracy, that heeding
the voice of the majority, does not ensure ethical action, thus legitimizing a “mistrust…of
the will of the majority.” This leads to his second critical point or opinion: that “the big
task today is precisely to reinvent large scale very strong social, political agents [or]
structures with strong authority,” and he seems to propose this as a defense against
corporatization, as a means of regulating unmitigated corporate power and control. Žižek
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mentions that humans are approaching the ability to reconstruct man through biogenetic
interventions; who, he asks, will regulate this?
Many sci-fi narratives envision the world at the end of humanity’s reign as ruled
by corporate entities. In the era of globalization, multinational corporations are able to
transcend shaky geographic and cultural/ideological state boundaries and to exercise
power based solely on profit, on capital, without adhering to religious, ideological, or
moral restrictions.19 Diffusing power, rather than concentrating it in (a) large scale
structure(s) that can rival the monetary power of multinational corporations, renders
individuals incapable of regulating corporations. As Žižek points out, the idea of
consumer power, of exerting power through purchasing practices, is largely ineffective; it
is a corporately-devised distraction. Thus, insofar as the left suggests only a diffusion of
power, there are, as the title of the video suggests, “no viable political alternatives to
unbridled capitalism” (Žižek). At the end of the video, Žižek even points towards
Hollywood science fiction narratives, as a clue to what is coming. “I always trust
Hollywood,” he states. “Hollywood is warning us all the time: Hunger Games, Elysium,
and so on. That’s the society we are approaching. Twenty percent of people live in the
privileged zone, [and] the majority is out. That’s the future” (Žižek).
Yet, while I agree that the left currently presents no viable political alternatives,
Žižek here only recapitulates the twentieth century binarism between the state and
democracy and the centuries old binarism between the collective and the individual.
Both dualisms merely reinvent totalizing master narratives that pit two opposing forces
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against each other in eternal battle, suggesting that there are only ever two options,
particularly in our increasingly globalized and assimilated world. Perhaps Western
thinking’s foundation in binaries is based on our conceptualization of life versus death
and of life versus the afterlife. Some Eastern master narratives blur this distinction; there
is life as a human, death, and then life again, whether animal or human. If we further blur
this distinction so that it becomes not only possible for a human to live and die and then
to live again as animal, but to live again as a machine or within a machine entirely devoid
of a physical body outside of a microchip, or to never die at all, then perhaps it will
become possible for us to unlock ourselves from the strict constraints of binary thought.
Donna Haraway embraces the metaphor of the cyborg as a “powerful infidel
heteroglossia,” capable of producing “a way out of the maze of dualisms in which we
have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves” (Haraway 2299). She suggests that
technoscience and the conflation between animal, human, and machine is truer to reality
than “the production of universal, totalizing theory…that misses most of reality,” such as
that to which Žižek seems to subscribe (Haraway 2299). While Žižek here deals with
political structures, particularly political structure informed by class and capital, and
Haraway deals with identity, class and identity interact, they inform one another, and they
are commensurate. I agree with Žižek that power diffused among a population cannot
compete with power concentrated in the hands of corporations that possess immense
capital in a political structure driven by the possession of capital. Yet, power
concentrated into a large state structure, as Žižek suggests, will inevitably produce a
totalizing structure that misses the reality of the people who submit their power to this
state.
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Mind uploading and virtual reality present a solution to this dichotomized
narrative. Whereas we seem pitted between serving our individual selves or serving
humanity, holistically a system like The Matrix (that we humans, rather than robots,
control) could be at once both totalizing and individualizing. Žižek rightly argues that
the “majority is not automatically right,” and indeed, the majority is often ill-informed,
scared, and in their fear, self-serving. As Althusser argues, ideology feeds ourselves and
our opinions to us, and it keeps us subservient and submissive to existing structures, to
dominant, totalizing hegemony. In this sense, the multiplication of language, of identity,
of theories and narratives becomes imperative. Yet, it also risks disorganizing our
collective power, as it multiplies the loci or the axes along which we align ourselves. We
can collect, as Haraway suggests, according to affinity rather than identity, but insofar as
we collect against something, we face the same situation as the English citizens who
toppled parliament in V for Vendetta. Whose ideology replaces the dominant hegemony
(Althusser 1488)?20 Who produces a new totalizing structure with a totalizing theory that
cannot possibly capture the whole of humanity and reality?
Divorced from our precarious reliance on material resources, from the “essence”
of nature and biology, perhaps human thought could transcend the binaries that constrains
it. Divorced from geography and physical edifice, perhaps power could diffuse; perhaps
it would not require ideology to maintain it because it would not need to be maintained.
Perhaps it could flow more freely through a collectively inhabited integrated circuit if the
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loss of power were not commensurate with death or suffering, with the inability to fulfill
one’s biological needs and imperatives.
Virtual reality could manifest in infinite ways. It could be an exact replica of the
world in which we currently live, work, interact, exchange goods, and struggle to survive.
We could replicate exactly our laws of physics, our environmental, political, and social
situations, the age of our sun, the asteroids aiming for our planet, etc. Or it could look
something like the OASIS or World of Warcraft or Runescape or The Sims. It could
replicate the earth and the universe at exactly the moment that human species began to
evolve; we could abandon all hope for ourselves and see if humanity might turn out
differently a second time. We could replicate, as in The Matrix, the age that we believe
to be the pinnacle of our species’ existence. Or a virtual reality could be all the
possibilities at once. Like the OASIS, we could all inhabit different planets within our
simulation, or flit between different servers that all contain the same simulation made
different by those who choose to inhabit it. Virtual reality does not demand we agree. It
is open to plural narratives, to the multiplication of identity. It does not demand a single
future or a single reality. Everyone could inhabit their own, individually created reality,
if they so choose.
No matter how it manifests, virtual reality has the unique ability to make
undeniably, tangibly visible what is invisible. I proposed that The Matrix was at once the
ideology and key to escaping ideological hegemony. Think again of Neo seeing The
Matrix as code, the laws of his reality manifesting before his eyes. If we were to inhabit
a virtual reality, we could have this same ability. The “nature” of our world could be
always readily visible to us: strings of code replacing patches of brickwork in buildings,
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etched into palm leaves, or visible in DNA sequences under a microscope. We could
switch between seeing the world as we have programmed it to be and the program itself.
We could, as Jeff Vandermeer suggested of augmented reality, allows ourselves to see
the “natural” laws that underpin the world we have simulated, the particles and elements
that constitute the mainframe that holds our simulation and simulated selves. Our
ideology could be always already apparent, and we could always already question
everything. For example: is my religion, my sex, my gender, my race, or my humanity
itself programmed or are these characteristics reality? Unlike in the OASIS, the
egalitarianism of a virtual reality separated from biology does not necessitate the
relinquishing of identity. Rather, it forces us to question the difference these
characteristics make. Are they a true difference at all? Are they even true? It reveals
that truth is merely programming; it is only what we conceive and code it to be.
Finally, returning to Žižek’s admonition that “the majority is not automatically
right,” I posit that in a virtual future, they could be, if not right, exceedingly more
informed than they are now. The most egalitarian virtual future that I can envision is one
in which every inhabitant of the simulation has equal say in the programming of the
simulation; each person’s equal ability to affect the world hardcoded into and
unchangeable within the programming itself (excepting, perhaps, our individually
possessed realities or planets). At first, drawing on Žižek’s argument, this seems to
exemplify his assertion that fully realized democracy is exceptionally dangerous. This
seems terribly disorganized, out of control, and terrifying. Yet, the same virtual reality
that allows this democracy also allows unparalleled equality both in its ability to expose
hegemonic ideology and its ability to imbue every consciousness with equal knowledge,
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or at least, to allow equal access to all knowledge and all perspectives. Information could
be downloaded directly into people’s consciousness. Like in Mixon’s Glass Houses,
individuals in the simulation could experience others’ consciousness, assimilating
differing perspectives and different conceptions of being based on gender or race into
their one consciousness, while still remaining an individual and exerting an individual
will. This will, however, would be more informed, more sympathetic, more considerate
of the collective without being forced to submit itself to the collective, as in Žižek’s
answer to unbridled capitalism. Thus, mind uploading uniquely creates a truly informed
majority all of whom literally have equal “say” coded into a virtual simulation. We could
all at once retain our individual consciousnesses while belonging to, or having access to,
a collective consciousness that echoes the Buddhist conception of the non-self, a “nonmanifestative consciousness;” in essence, of omniscience (Walshe 242). All languages,
literal and figurative, could be made common without the imperialism that Haraway
fears; our common language could be, and must be, the culmination of all languages.

IV. Conclusion
The purpose of this project is not to create a totalizing theory of virtual reality and
what it can or should be. In that this brief essay is part of a larger, ongoing project, I
make no claims to address all ethical concerns or all possibilities of a virtual future, the
opening up of human consciousness, the pluralizing of human identity and reality, or
blurring the demarcations between individual subjects. Rather, my aim was simply to
implore readers, thinkers, writers of the future and of science fiction to envision this
future, to explore its possibilities not merely to alleviate or distract from dystopian
futures, but to radically revise the future. The proliferation of dystopian science fiction
both presents and perpetuates a resignation to the collapse of our planet’s ecosystems, its
biodiversity, and consequently, of civilization itself.
Yet, though it is perhaps intended to warn humans that our future, if we do not
actively fight to change it, will be bleak, it also serves to inure us to environmental
devastation and the conditions that produce it. There is a two-way street of interaction
between literature—rather, between all media—and the culture that produces it. While
literature reflects the world, it is also a site through which we negotiate and write the
world. If the discourse concerning climate change and its depiction in various media may
be desensitizing us to it, perhaps the solution is, rather than portraying the inevitable, to
imagine what is possible; to excite ourselves in the imagining of innovative solutions that
address not only climate change, but the myriad other social, political, and even medical
problems we face. Or, perhaps the solution is to tap in to our human drive to migrate,
explore, and discover, or our desire for immortality and eternal youth. Perhaps the
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solution is to imagine a solution, a future, that renders all of these considerations
insignificant. Perhaps the solution is a virtual future.
To this end, I will present some questions concerning mind uploading and virtual
reality that myself and others can perhaps speculatively answer in the near future.
Hopefully, our speculations can soon after be corroborated, qualified, or discredited. My
goal is not to be correct, it is merely to generate a conversation about the possibilities of
virtual reality and about our ability to solve the political, social, and environmental
problems we face. I hope that this project has raised as many questions as its argument
has attempted to answer.
To conclude, I will explicitly raise just a few more questions that I or you or
someone else can someday answer: If capitalism and development are the impetus for
the realization of uploading our minds to a virtual reality, how can we overcome this
impetus to realize a more egalitarian future? In addition to realizing immortality, how
can abandoning our biological bodies and inhabiting a virtual realm benefit us medically?
Along with increasing our access to information, how might uploading our minds to a
machine affect the way that humans learn?21 How might humans living in a virtual
reality form their own subjectivities and identities? How would it change the ways that
humans interact? How might it enable us to explore the cosmos more easily? What
would a mainframe storing all of humanity look like, and how might it function?
Innumerable questions remain to be asked; even more to be answered. As we
address these questions, I hope that we also consider how the answers might bear on our

Consider the way that children’s brains form new neural connections when learning
new information, whereas adults incorporate new information into existing neural
structures.
21
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present as well as our future. Many scientists and philosophers suggest we may be living
in one now (Bostrom 243). If we look closely enough, perhaps we can see the code
underlying our existence and begin to question our natural assumptions about our biology
and what it means to be human. Perhaps we do not have to overcome our biology before
reaping some of the benefits of uploading our minds.
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